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For women in Malaysia, equal representation in elected office, particularly in positions of 
political power, continues to be a challenge. Even though female candidates performed better 
than their male peers in GE14, women hold only 32 of the 222 parliamentary seats (14.4 per 
cent1) due to a gender gap in candidacy (Yeong, 2018). Women accounted for 10.8 per cent of 
candidates nominated to stand for election, despite constituting 25–50 per cent of members in 
major political parties (Tan, 2011). The winning alliance, Pakatan Harapan (PH), fielded 85 
women out of a total of 660 candidates (Bernama, 2018), thus falling short of their electoral 
pledge to ensure that ‘at least 30% of policymakers are women’2 (Pakatan Harapan, 2018: 
140). While the new PH government appointed more women to the Cabinet than previous 
administrations3, including the country’s first woman deputy prime minister, the long-
standing gender gap in Malaysia’s highest decision-making body remains substantial: only 5 
of the 26 ministers and 4 of the 23 deputy ministers are women. This female under-
representation has not, however, generated much public criticism and it is this widespread 
acceptance of the status quo that is the focus of the present study. 
This chapter engages in a close textual analysis of the #30peratus4 Twitter campaign led 
by feminist activists to demand 30 per cent women in the Malaysian Cabinet. By examining 
the social debate surrounding women’s minority representation in the ministerial body, this 
study aims to develop a critical understanding of the ideologies and discourses in the public 
sphere that maintain apathy towards this ‘glass ceiling’ and obfuscate the gender 
discrimination that persists in the ostensibly new political climate. As ‘discourse’ is a 
polysemous concept, it is necessary to clarify that it is understood here as socio-historically 
 
1 While this figure is the highest in Malaysian history, at the time of writing, i.e. October 2018, Malaysia ranks 
137th among 194 countries for the proportion of women MPs (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2018). 
2 Malaysia is a signatory of the Beijing Platform for Action, which called on governments to set specific targets 
to ensure women’s equal participation in power structures and decision-making. 
3 Prior to GE14, the number of women ministers had never exceeded 3 in any administration. 
4 Malay for 30 per cent. 
contingent signification practices that ‘systematically form the objects of which they speak’ 
(Foucault, 1972: 49). Discourses reproduce the prejudice, gender stereotypes and ideologies 
that are used to marginalise women and legitimise male privilege, such as the ideology of 
separate spheres that continues to constrain women’s access to political office around the 
world5. Therefore, research on dominant discourses in public debates can reveal much about 
the ideologies that sustain the prevailing gendered patterns of exclusion operating within 
Malaysian political institutions. Since less than 10 per cent of the Malaysian population are 
active on Twitter (Khong, 2016), there is a limitation to how far it is possible to generalise the 
findings of this study. Nevertheless, the online debates serve as a useful gateway that opens 
up identification of ideologies and discourses that keep public pressure for gender reform at a 
low level. 
To situate the online campaign and analysis, I begin with a discussion on women’s 
descriptive and substantive representation, before outlining the development of the 
#30peratus initiative. I move on to briefly explain my methodology and analytical approach. 
Then, drawing on feminist critical discourse analysis, I deconstruct the ideological discourses 
in the Twitter content that legitimise and rationalise women’s lack of access to political power 
structures. I then discuss the hegemonic status of the ideologies and discourses identified. 
Finally, this chapter closes with a few recommendations for further research. 
 
Women’s Representation in Politics and Decision-Making 
Scholars and theorists have long debated whether the increased descriptive representation of 
women in legislative bodies would improve women’s substantive representation. Proponents 
of a politics of presence have called for the enhancement of women’s political participation 
based on arguments of social justice and on claims that this will substantively improve 
policy-making processes and outcomes (Grey, 2006). In the context of Malaysia, Tan and 
Ong (2009: 105) argue that bringing more women’s voices to legislative assemblies can 
introduce much-needed diversity to these debating chambers and support the consideration of 
differing perspectives, realities and concerns among women across the population. This will 
dilute the essentialism of women in laws, making these legislations ‘better equipped to deal 
with and address the needs of women who face multiple discriminations, for example, on the 
grounds of gender, class, ethnicity, and level of education’. 
 
5 In many countries, who is deemed suitable to be involved in politics is underpinned by an ideology that sees 
politics as a male sphere and women as interlopers. See Celis et al. (2013) for a fuller discussion. 
Critics of descriptive representation, however, stress that measurable improvements in 
women’s lives and status are facilitated not by higher numbers of women office-holders, but 
through ‘critical acts’ that enhance the position of women considerably, such as the 
introduction of gender quotas (Dahlerup, 2006). While within this view critical actors can be 
elected officials of any sex who advocate in the interest of the women they represent (Childs 
and Krook, 2006), studies have repeatedly shown that women in political office tend to place 
a higher priority on women’s needs than their male colleagues (e.g., Bratton, 2005). Having 
reviewed empirical literature on issues of substantive representation, Celis et al. (2008) report 
that although an increase in the number of women legislators does not automatically translate 
into more women-friendly policy outcomes, women parliamentarians often feel an obligation 
to represent women and share the opinions of women voters and activists. 
Weldon (2002) suggests looking beyond individual legislators since potential critical 
actors can include women’s movements operating as a collective in nonconventional political 
arenas. This seems to ring true for Malaysia, where substantive changes have depended 
crucially on women’s organisations successfully forcing their agenda on the state (Tan, 2011). 
Nonetheless, advances in redressing women’s issues have been uneven and slow as these 
NGOs have had to work through ‘various sympathetic (or otherwise) officials in the 
government just to get an issue or event recognised as problematic, let alone rectified’. In the 
process of negotiating their demands, they are obliged to make many concessions and 
compromises6 (Martinez, 2003: 87). As such, civil society groups have demanded the 
imposition of gender quotas to accelerate the entry of women into legislative and ministerial 
bodies based on the belief that this will help push women’s issues to the forefront of the 
political agenda. 
 
The #30peratus Campaign 
On 10 May 2018, a day after GE14, a group of seven women’s rights advocates released a 
statement7 calling for a minimum 30 per cent women in Cabinet (Kuga Thas et al., 2018). 
This was quickly followed by the #30peratus Twitter campaign, which attempted to mobilise 
 
6 The Domestic Violence Act is a prime example. After almost a decade of agitation by the Joint Action Group 
for Gender Equality, the government established the Act in 1994. However, the activists had to not only accept a 
compromised version of the Act, but also lobby for a further 2 years before the legislation was implemented in 
1996 (Tan, 2011). 
7 The statement was dated 11 May, but was posted on Twitter on 10 May. 
Malaysians to demand the PH government ‘to uphold their promises to put at least 30% 
women in all levels of governance’ (EMPOWER, 2018). This 30 per cent figure is often 
regarded as the crucial turning point for minority groups to have a substantive impact on 
legislative outcomes. At present, more than 130 countries have adopted some form of gender 
quota to enhance women's political representation, with the most widespread quota 
percentage being 30 per cent (International IDEA, Inter-Parliamentary Union and Stockholm 
University, 2018; Dahlerup, 2006). While scholars have rightly urged for a more guarded 
approach towards the notion of a ‘critical mass’8, such as 30 per cent women, this concept has 
been important for the international trend of introducing electoral gender quotas, which, in 
turn, has facilitated increased levels of women in national parliaments (Childs and Krook, 
2006; Dahlerup, 2006). In this regard, the 30 per cent target serves as a valuable milestone 
towards gender parity in decision-making.  
Over the subsequent months, Twitter served as an important forum for public debate on 
gender equality in Malaysian political life, with #30peratus and #30percent emerging as the 
most frequently used hashtags marking the topic. Although the incorporation of social media 
in issue-based movements has the potential to fuel civic involvement and influence state 
policies and public opinion, the actual impact of digital activism is not always as hoped. In 
the case of the #30peratus campaign, not only did the government eventually fail to fulfil its 
pledge, but the virtual forum also became a highly contested space wherein hegemonic views 
on gender were frequently expressed. As such, this online campaign provides us with a lens 
on varying perspectives on women’s participation in high public office and the complexity of 
the struggle for equal gender representation. 
 
Data and Analytical Approach 
For the purpose of this study, I constructed a corpus of tweets containing the hashtags 
#30peratus or #30percent posted from 10 May until 2 July 2018 when the full Cabinet was 
sworn in. Replies to these posts were also included, while hashtagged messages that did not 
discuss women’s political representation in Malaysia were discarded. Not all tweets on the 
issue were marked with a hashtag, which means that some relevant data could not be 
collected. Nevertheless, users of #30peratus and #30percent often republished these messages 
 
8 According to the critical mass theory, ‘only when the proportion of women in a political institution reaches a 
certain percentage would women be able to ‘act for’ women as a group’ (Tan, 2011: 81). See Celis et al. (2008), 
Childs and Krook (2006) and Dahlerup (2006) for a full critique of the theory. 
to display their stance towards another position. By including these retweets, the dataset is 
made more representative.  
The corpus contained approximately 2,000 tweets and replies posted in English and 
Malay by women’s rights groups, activists, media professionals, academics, politicians and 
other members of the public. These texts were interrogated through feminist critical discourse 
analysis, a research paradigm ‘concerned with demystifying the interrelationships of gender, 
power and ideology in discourse’ (Lazar, 2005: 5). Guided by feminist principles and 
insights, I perform a close linguistic analysis of the data to unravel the ideologies on Twitter 
that legitimise hegemonic gender relations in Malaysian politics and the dominant discourses 
that propagate and naturalise these ideologies. 
 
The Neoliberal and Postfeminist Legitimation of Political Gender Inequality  
The analysis indicates that not only are patriarchal attitudes towards women in politics 
prevalent among Malaysian Twitter users, but, crucially, discourses endorsing patriarchal 
ideologies9 are often legitimised in terms of neoliberal and postfeminist discourses. 
Neoliberalism is a system of thought in favour of privatisation, self-interest and self-reliance. 
Within this ideology, individuals are conceptualised as entrepreneurial actors who are 
personally accountable for their progress, no matter the disadvantages faced due to their 
circumstances (Brown, 2003). This neoliberal emphasis on self-responsibilisation chimes 
with postfeminism, which celebrates selected ideas associated with feminism like women’s 
empowerment, choice and autonomy, but insists that gender equality has been achieved and, 
therefore, feminism is redundant (McRobbie, 2004). Like neoliberalism, it replaces any 
notion of individuals as subject to pressures or constraints outside themselves (Gill, 2008) 
with a feel-good narrative of self-determination and self-efficacy. In the following, I closely 
examine the knots of patriarchal, neoliberal and postfeminist discourses that preserve the 
hegemonic paradigm justifying women’s exclusion from positions of political power. 
 
The Entanglement of Misogynistic and Meritocratic Discourses 
As many tweets against the 30 per cent women quota share the implicit assumption that 
women MPs are less qualified for ministerial posts than their male peers, I begin by 
 
9 Systems of beliefs that legitimate power relations which ‘privilege men as a social group and disadvantage, 
exclude and disempower women as a social group’ (Lazar, 2005: 5). 
interrogating the proliferation of the patriarchal ‘women are not up to the job’ discourse, as in 
this response to the 10 May statement: 
 
 (1) Honestly just for the start ignore the gender and go for merit first. They are starting 
with 10 ministries first. Get the most capable in then do the inclusiveness thing later. 
Also sidenote at cabinet level, experience and character are as important as qualifications 
 
The imperative ignore and sequence adverb later trigger a value assumption, that is, an 
assumption about ‘what is good or desirable’ (Fairclough, 2003: 55). If the gender (of the 
MPs) should be ignored and the inclusiveness thing should be done later, then enhancing 
gender diversity in Cabinet, and effectively selecting more women, are assumed to be 
undesirable. Whilst the basis for this negative evaluation is not made explicit, it appears tied 
to ‘women are not up to the job’ since the contrast between ignore/go for and first/later 
creates a strong impression of opposition between appointing women ministers and selecting 
those with merit and the most capable. As there is no unambiguous reference to men in the 
most capable, this noun phrase could refer to competent parliamentarians of any sex10. Yet, 
when we consider that only three women ministers11 were needed to fill the quota at that 
time, the Twitter user’s disapproval of affirmative action suggests serious, though perhaps 
unconscious, reservations about women’s political calibre. This is possibly because women 
do not fit the typical image of the ideal (male) leader. The ‘male-as-norm’ discourse is 
perceptible in the assertion experience and character are as important as qualifications. Read 
as a direct response to the activists’ statement which highlighted the academic credentials of 
twenty female MPs, it strongly implies that women parliamentarians lack experience and 
character12, while overlooking the fact that many of their male colleagues were themselves 
new to governance. 
The ‘women are not up to the job’ discourse is not new. Researchers have long held that 
deep-seated beliefs against the ability of women to lead has curtailed their advancement 
within the political realm (e.g., Rashila, 1998). Of note here is its intimate entanglement with 
 
10 The tweeter argues later in the thread that ‘It’s meant to read as whoever regardless of gender who is 
capable’. 
11 The Prime Minister had announced that the PH government would first form a partial ten-ministry cabinet. 
12 These MPs’ political experience and the issues they champion were also described in the statement to 
demonstrate that there are a sufficient number of competent women in parliament. 
the neoliberal13 discourse of meritocracy in the Twitter debates. Again and again, the 
patriarchal misogyny underlying ‘women are not up to the job’ is masked by the prevailing 
meritocratic discourse, textually cued in (1) above by merit and the most capable. Within the 
Malaysian context where neoliberal meritocracy is often construed as binary opposed to 
corruption and race-based cronyism14, these nominals carry a moral charge. Their 
juxtaposition against the gender and the inclusiveness thing constructs gender quotas as 
morally questionable opportunism, thereby delegitimising15 them. As such, rejecting gender-
based reform becomes a moral act instead of a sexist one.  
 
Nation Rebuilding as Rationalisation  
In numerous instances, the fusion of the trope of nation rebuilding with the discourse of 
meritocracy provides an alibi for discriminatory beliefs: 
 
 (2) Malaysia is undergoing pemulihan [recovery] process. Put the capable and wise one 
first regardless the gender. 
 
 (3) apa yg lebih penting adalah selamatkan negara,tak pyh kisah lah lelaki ka 
perempuan,yg penting,benar2 hebat dan layak [what is more important is to save the 
country. no need to care if they are a man or woman, what is important is that they are 
truly great and qualified] 
  
In the extracts above, the objection to the demand for 30 per cent women in Cabinet relies on 
the assumption that there are not enough capable, wise or qualified parliamentary women to 
meet the quota. As with (1), this sexist view is obfuscated by meritocratic discourse that 
 
13 Littler (2018: 2) makes the link between meritocracy and neoliberalism explicit, arguing that meritocracy is ‘a 
key ideological term in the reproduction of neoliberal culture … It proclaims greater equality of opportunity for 
more people than ever before’ and encourages us ‘to believe that if we try hard enough we can make it: that race 
or class or gender are not, on a fundamental level, significant barriers to success’. 
14 Over the years, there have been strong calls for a meritocratic system to replace pro-bumiputra policies, 
which are seen as institutionalising racism and favouring rent-seeking behaviour and crony capitalism (Chin, 
2009). 
15 Within van Leeuwen’s (2007) framework on discursive legitimation, moral evaluation legitimates or 
delegitimates practices by reference to value systems, in this case the value system of meritocracy. 
delegitimates preferential policies. This moral evaluation occurs in combination with 
instrumental rationalisation16 for supporting meritocracy. Constructed national interests, 
referenced by emotionally-laden metaphors (undergoing [recovery], save the country), 
provide compelling reasons for meritocracy, thus delegitimising gender quotas further. 
 Another patriarchal discourse that contributes strongly to the social acceptance of 
women’s under-representation in Cabinet is ‘women’s political empowerment is inessential’. 
In (1), the noun phrase the inclusiveness thing betrays a dismissive attitude towards bringing 
women to the decision-making table. This discourse is given new potency by zero-sum 
thinking between effecting gender parity and addressing political scandals, as illustrated in 
this example: 
 
 (4) You guys are not helping the situation by putting pressure on the new govt. They have 
major issues to deal with. Give them time to sort things out. Relax and calm down. Your 
voices will be heard, but now is definitely not the time. 
 
The verb phrase are not helping creates the conventional implicature that pressuring the 
government for 30 per cent women ministers is undesirable, in this case because it ostensibly 
hinders PH from resolving the country’s legacy issues of corruption and debt. In the Twitter 
debates, such argumentation centred on nation rebuilding often obscures the underlying 
problem that women are not valued as leaders and policy-makers. In this post, the tweeter had 
various options for how to refer to the alleged crimes. His choice of major issues is a textual 
cue to his views not only on the suspected abuse of power by Barisan Nasional, but also on 
the demand for gender-equal political participation. The adjective major invokes the 
major/trivial opposition17, which suggests that the latter issue is inconsequential in contrast to 
the former. The problem of women’s meaningful representation is finally brushed aside with 
now is definitely not the time, reinforcing ‘women’s political empowerment is inessential’. 
 
The Postfeminist Myth of Gender Equality 
Many Twitter users appear to have been lulled into the postfeminist illusion that we are now 
 
16 Instrumental rationalisation ‘legitimates practices by reference to their goals, uses and effects’ (van Leeuwen, 
2007: 101). 
17 According to Jeffries’s (2010) notion of auto-evocation, using a term can invoke its conventional opposite. 
beyond inequalities of gender. In (4) above, assumptions specific to the ‘gender equality has 
been achieved’ discourse underlie the assertion Your voices will be heard. The modal verb 
will indicates a strong commitment to the myth that women’s concerns are adequately taken 
into account. Another closely related observation is that in the postfeminist guise of structural 
equality, women are often endowed with capacity. Several posts made references to former 
and current female ministers to underscore the self-efficacy of women in the political domain: 
 
(5) Rafidah Aziz can do it without quota. 
 
In presenting the former Minister of International Trade and Industry as ‘proof’ that gender 
quotas are unnecessary for female success, the assertion in (5) reinforces ‘gender equality has 
been achieved’. Embedded within this tweet is the discourse that women can ‘have it all’ if 
they work harder on the self. The following extracts are salient examples of how the latter 
discourse operates: 
 
(6) EARN your rights. Without your asking, cabinet placement will take place. 
 
 (7) Equality is not a number. We must tampilkan diri [put ourselves forward] and show 
kebolehan [our capabilities]. Is not for men to push us up front my sister 
 
Superficially, these messages appear to embolden women. A closer examination of the texts, 
however, reveals traces of non-emancipatory postfeminist and neoliberal notions. By 
interpellating women as enterprising subjects of capacity through the directives EARN your 
rights and We must [put ourselves forward] and show [our capabilities], the Twitter users 
erroneously assume a level playing field and incite women to greater self-responsibilisation. 
Both extracts reject collective solutions and government intervention. As with (4), the modal 
verb will in (6) conveys a strong belief that we live in a gender-equal Malaysia and, therefore, 
further activism is unnecessary (Without your asking). In (7), the obligational modality must 
not only presents the neoliberal imperative to strive for achievement as compulsory, but also 
places the responsibility for change squarely on the individual. This emphasis on self-
transformation rather than social transformation is reinforced in the negative proposition at 
the end of (7). By stating what should not happen, the tweeter conceptualises a hypothetical 
situation where women are able to advance through their own efforts without any changes on 
the part of the men who currently hold power. 
 
Ideological Hegemony and Gendered Power Relations in Malaysian Politics 
The present research leverages on the large volume of social interactions during the 
#30peratus Twitter campaign to gain a deeper understanding of the ideological positions of 
Malaysians on the issue of women’s low representation in Cabinet. The findings indicate that 
women’s political leadership is undervalued in Malaysia Baru, at least among Twitter users. 
This has clear continuities with earlier research that argues that widespread stereotyping of 
women as supporters rather than leaders hinders women’s descriptive and substantive 
representation in the country (e.g. Ministry of Women and Family Development, 2003), 
which also underscores the hegemonic status of patriarchal ideologies in Malaysia. 
Importantly, this study illustrates how hegemonic gendered power relations in Malaysian 
politics are maintained18 through discursive means in nonconventional political arenas such 
as social media. Given the constitutive capacity of discourses, the frequent reinforcement of 
‘women are not up to the job’ and ‘women’s political empowerment is inessential’ in the 
online discussions not only reflects, but contributes to the devaluation of women’s leadership 
capabilities19, thus mystifying patriarchal power arrangements that have segregated 
Malaysian women from positions of political authority.  
 The patriarchal ideology that undergirds the general acceptance of women’s exclusion 
from the ministerial body is upheld by a fusion of postfeminism and neoliberalism. Feminists 
are increasingly identifying these ideologies as critical dimensions of gender equality 
struggles as they close down the space for confronting issues of injustice that persist. 
Neoliberalism, in particular, has ‘pervasive effects on ways of thought to the point where it 
has become incorporated into the common-sense way many … interpret, live in, and 
understand the world’ (Harvey, 2005: 3). The data analysis strongly suggests that neoliberal 
meritocratic discourse at least has become hegemonic in particular segments of Malaysian 
society. Since hegemony depends on social consent, the moral standing of the dominant 
social group is crucial. In the case of this study, male hegemonic power in politics is 
 
18 They are also contested in the Twitter debates. However, examining resistant discourses is beyond the scope 
of this study. 
19 By not meeting the gender quota, the PH government indirectly authorised these beliefs at an institutional 
level. 
maintained by a moralised neoliberal understanding of meritocracy20. The moralistic 
dimension of neoliberal meritocracy, in turn, is arguably galvanised by decades of public 
dissatisfaction with race-based affirmative action policies in Malaysia as well as on-going 
political scandals involving a party that is seen as the antithesis of a meritocratic order. In 
other words, following Gramsci’s (1971) theory of hegemony, we could argue that the Twitter 
users are not dupes of ideology. Rather, they knowingly compromise and consent to the 
perpetuation of a patriarchal social order, but have legitimated their opinions and resisted 
improvements to women’s situation in politics from what they believe to be a moral position 
of national interest. 
Relatedly, the counter-arguments against the gender quota are also often premised on the 
postfeminist illusion of egalitarianism. Many opposing the gender quota emphasise women’s 
self-efficacy and agency, framing women’s political advancement as a purely personal 
endeavour while ignoring the social, structural and material constraints to women’s agency. 
This attribution of female capacity could partly stem from a ‘collective delusion … that 
freedom of the market and an unfettered mass-consumer culture are good enough measures to 
exact personal autonomy and power’ (Ng et al., 2006: 39). Further, the analysis shows that for 
some, the (gradual) rise of women in high-profile public roles is sufficient evidence that 
gender-based reforms in Malaysian politics are not needed. Hence, we can argue that 
providing a small percentage of women with the opportunity to ascend to positions of 
political power functions as a hegemonic strategy to diffuse feminist politics. Given that 
gender-based reforms have been a protracted process21, collective pressure is critically 
important for bringing about gender parity. However, as we have seen in this study, the 
privatisation of issues of inequality and the repudiation of structural power relations pose 
challenges for women’s political organising in Malaysia. 
 
Conclusion 
This study provides an empirical account of ideologies and discourses emerging from a 
specific part of the Twittersphere that endorse gendered patterns of exclusion operating 
within the Malaysian political sphere. The persistence of patriarchal attitudes reflects earlier 
studies on the elements impeding women’s path to political power in Malaysia. However, a 
 
20 Littler (2008) argues that within meritocratic discourse, competitive participation has come to be presented as 
a moral obligation. 
21 See Tan (2011). 
closer look at how women’s lack of access to power structures is reasoned in the tweets 
reveals a more complex picture in which postfeminist and neoliberal discourses make the 
status quo appear moral and commonsensical rather than unjust. In fact, the (implicit) 
disavowal of sexism is a key mechanism through which gender inequalities in political life 
are excused and preserved. To better understand the significance of the interpenetration of 
patriarchal, neoliberal and postfeminist discourses observed in this study, we need to examine 
discourses in other formal and informal political contexts beyond Twitter use. While scholars 
have rightly critiqued patriarchal party structures and norms in Malaysia, it is equally 
important to explore the role that ideologies and discourses play in constituting and 
sustaining the structures and norms that disadvantage women in political life. There is also a 
need for more research that confronts the attraction of neoliberalism and postfeminism and 
how they achieve their effective governance in certain segments of Malaysian society. To 
grasp their power, the research community needs to attend to the affective dimensions of 
these ideologies and address questions of investment and desire (Gill, 2008). 
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